fix: the kcalloc() and kmalloc() calls at cache in cache.c#3588
Open
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix: the kcalloc() and kmalloc() calls at cache in cache.c#3588orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Fix critical severity security issue in
SQUASHFS/squashfs-tools-4.4/kernel/kernel-2.6/fs/squashfs/cache.c.Vulnerability
V-004SQUASHFS/squashfs-tools-4.4/kernel/kernel-2.6/fs/squashfs/cache.c:244Description: The kcalloc() and kmalloc() calls at cache.c lines 244, 266, 273, and 402 use
entriesandpagesvalues derived directly from the SquashFS image superblock without validating them against architecture-defined maximums. On 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts an image with an extremely largeentriesvalue (e.g., 0x40000001 where sizeof(*cache->entry) = 8), the multiplicationentries * sizeof(*(cache->entry))overflows size_t, resulting in a tiny allocation (e.g., 8 bytes). Subsequent writes to cache->entry[i] for any index i > 0 overflow the undersized buffer, corrupting heap memory.Changes
SQUASHFS/squashfs-tools-4.4/kernel/kernel-2.6/fs/squashfs/cache.cVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security