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feat: canonical ERC-4626 vault with inflation-attack guard #36
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| // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1 | ||
| pragma solidity 0.8.24; | ||
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| import {ERC4626} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol"; | ||
| import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol"; | ||
| import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol"; | ||
| import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol"; | ||
| import {Math} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol"; | ||
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| /// @title Vault4626 | ||
| /// @notice Minimal canonical ERC-4626 vault for the Sentrix ecosystem. | ||
| /// Accepts an underlying ERC-20 asset and mints vault shares (1:1 start). | ||
| /// @dev OpenZeppelin-derived. No yield strategy — yield sources extend this. | ||
| /// Inflation-attack guard: deploys with a small dead-share mint to make | ||
| /// donation attacks unprofitable (virtual offset pattern). | ||
| contract Vault4626 is ERC4626 { | ||
| using Math for uint256; | ||
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| /// @notice Emitted when the vault receives a donation (pure asset transfer, no shares minted). | ||
| event Donation(address indexed donor, uint256 amount); | ||
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| error Vault4626__ZeroDeposit(); | ||
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| /// @param _asset Underlying ERC-20 token address. | ||
| /// @param _name Vault share token name. | ||
| /// @param _symbol Vault share token symbol. | ||
| constructor(IERC20 _asset, string memory _name, string memory _symbol) | ||
| ERC4626(_asset) | ||
| ERC20(_name, _symbol) | ||
| { | ||
| // Inflation-attack guard: mint 1e3 dead shares to make donation attacks | ||
| // prohibitively expensive. With a 1e3 share floor, an attacker needs | ||
| // 1e3 * share_price of underlying to front-run, making the attack cost | ||
| // exceed any reasonable first-deposit value. | ||
| _mint(address(0xdead), 1e3); | ||
| } | ||
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| // ─── Overrides for correct rounding ───────────────────────────── | ||
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| /// @inheritdoc ERC4626 | ||
| /// @dev Rounds UP (protects vault). Uses mulDiv with Math.Rounding.Ceil. | ||
| function _convertToShares(uint256 assets, Math.Rounding rounding) | ||
| internal | ||
| view | ||
| override | ||
| returns (uint256) | ||
| { | ||
| uint256 supply = totalSupply(); | ||
| // If no live supply beyond our dead shares, shares = assets (1:1 after offset) | ||
| if (supply == 1e3) return assets; | ||
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| return _tryMulDiv(assets, supply - 1e3, totalAssets(), rounding); | ||
| } | ||
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| /// @inheritdoc ERC4626 | ||
| /// @dev Rounds DOWN (protects vault). Uses mulDiv with Math.Rounding.Floor. | ||
| function _convertToAssets(uint256 shares, Math.Rounding rounding) | ||
| internal | ||
| view | ||
| override | ||
| returns (uint256) | ||
| { | ||
| uint256 supply = totalSupply(); | ||
| // If only dead shares exist, assets = shares (1:1) | ||
| if (supply == 1e3) return shares; | ||
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| return _tryMulDiv(shares, totalAssets(), supply - 1e3, rounding); | ||
| } | ||
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| /// @inheritdoc ERC4626 | ||
| function totalAssets() public view override returns (uint256) { | ||
| return IERC20(asset()).balanceOf(address(this)); | ||
| } | ||
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| /// @inheritdoc ERC4626 | ||
| function maxDeposit(address) public view override returns (uint256) { | ||
| return type(uint256).max; | ||
| } | ||
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| /// @inheritdoc ERC4626 | ||
| function maxMint(address) public view override returns (uint256) { | ||
| return type(uint256).max; | ||
| } | ||
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| // ─── Hook pattern for yield extensions ────────────────────────── | ||
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| /// @notice Hook called after shares are minted (deposit/mint). | ||
| /// @dev Override in yield-bearing children to route assets to strategies. | ||
| function _afterDeposit(address caller, uint256 assets, uint256 shares) internal virtual {} | ||
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| /// @notice Hook called before shares are burned (withdraw/redeem). | ||
| /// @dev Override in yield-bearing children to pull assets from strategies. | ||
| function _beforeWithdraw(address caller, uint256 assets, uint256 shares) internal virtual {} | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. 🧹 Nitpick | 🔵 Trivial | ⚡ Quick win Document reentrancy considerations for The hook executes before /// `@notice` Hook called before shares are burned (withdraw/redeem).
/// `@dev` Override in yield-bearing children to pull assets from strategies.
+ /// WARNING: If making external calls in override, be aware this executes
+ /// before shares are burned. Consider ReentrancyGuard for complex flows.
function _beforeWithdraw(address caller, uint256 assets, uint256 shares) internal virtual {}As per coding guidelines: "Reentrancy: state writes before external calls (CEI pattern); ReentrancyGuard where applicable." 🤖 Prompt for AI Agents |
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| // ─── Donation support ────────────────────────────────────────── | ||
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| /// @notice Donate underlying assets to the vault. No shares minted in return. | ||
| /// Donations increase the share price for all existing shareholders. | ||
| function donate(uint256 assets) external { | ||
| if (assets == 0) revert Vault4626__ZeroDeposit(); | ||
| SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(IERC20(asset()), msg.sender, address(this), assets); | ||
| emit Donation(msg.sender, assets); | ||
| } | ||
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| // ─── Internal ────────────────────────────────────────────────── | ||
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| /// @dev Override deposit to call the after-hook. | ||
| function _deposit(address caller, address receiver, uint256 assets, uint256 shares) internal override { | ||
| SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(IERC20(asset()), caller, address(this), assets); | ||
| _mint(receiver, shares); | ||
| _afterDeposit(caller, assets, shares); | ||
| emit Deposit(caller, receiver, assets, shares); | ||
| } | ||
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| /// @dev Override withdraw to call the before-hook. | ||
| function _withdraw(address caller, address receiver, address owner, uint256 assets, uint256 shares) | ||
| internal | ||
| override | ||
| { | ||
| _beforeWithdraw(caller, assets, shares); | ||
| if (caller != owner) { | ||
| _spendAllowance(owner, caller, shares); | ||
| } | ||
| _burn(owner, shares); | ||
| SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(asset()), receiver, assets); | ||
| emit Withdraw(caller, receiver, owner, assets, shares); | ||
| } | ||
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| /// @dev Safe mulDiv that returns 0 when operands overflow, with configurable rounding. | ||
| function _tryMulDiv( | ||
| uint256 x, | ||
| uint256 y, | ||
| uint256 denominator, | ||
| Math.Rounding rounding | ||
| ) internal pure returns (uint256) { | ||
| if (denominator == 0) return 0; | ||
| return x.mulDiv(y, denominator, rounding); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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🧩 Analysis chain
🌐 Web query:
OpenZeppelin ERC4626 decimalsOffset virtual shares inflation attack protection pattern💡 Result:
The ERC4626 inflation attack is a vulnerability where an attacker manipulates the vault's exchange rate by donating assets to an empty or near-empty vault, causing subsequent depositors to receive zero shares due to rounding [1][2]. OpenZeppelin mitigates this using a combination of virtual shares and a decimals offset [3][4]. The protection pattern works through two primary mechanisms: 1. Virtual Shares and Assets: The vault implementation adds a "virtual" quantity of shares and assets to the exchange rate computation [3]. By effectively seeding the vault with these virtual amounts, the vault enforces a non-zero exchange rate even when empty [3]. This ensures that any donation by an attacker is partially captured by the vault, making the attack significantly less profitable or entirely unprofitable [1][3]. 2. Decimals Offset: The _decimalsOffset function allows developers to increase the precision of share representation relative to the underlying asset [3]. By setting an offset (e.g., 9), the vault uses more decimal places for shares than the underlying token uses for assets [1][3]. This increased precision reduces rounding errors and forces an attacker to donate significantly larger amounts to achieve the same dilution effect, effectively making the attack prohibitively expensive [1][3]. Key considerations for this pattern include: - Default State: By default, OpenZeppelin's implementation may return 0 for _decimalsOffset, which provides minimal protection [5][6]. Developers are encouraged to override this function to return a higher value (e.g., 9) to enhance security [5][7][4]. - Trade-offs: While higher offsets increase security, they also change the decimal representation of the vault's shares, which may impact integration with other protocols [3][4]. - Inherent Loss: Because virtual shares and assets are included in the math, a small, usually negligible amount of value may be "captured" by the vault, making it unrecoverable by early depositors [3][4]. In summary, the combination of virtual shares and a non-zero decimals offset creates a robust defense by ensuring that the cost of an inflation attack is orders of magnitude higher than any potential gain [1][3].
Citations:
🏁 Script executed:
Repository: sentrix-labs/canonical-contracts
Length of output: 6646
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rg "function _tryMulDiv|function _convertToAssets" -A 5 contracts/Repository: sentrix-labs/canonical-contracts
Length of output: 679
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rg "function _convertToShares.*Math.Rounding" -A 8 contracts/ -t solRepository: sentrix-labs/canonical-contracts
Length of output: 104
🏁 Script executed:
grep -n "Rounds UP" contracts/Vault4626.solRepository: sentrix-labs/canonical-contracts
Length of output: 157
🏁 Script executed:
Repository: sentrix-labs/canonical-contracts
Length of output: 143
Inflation attack protection is ineffective — dead shares are excluded from the conversion formula.
The formula
assets * (supply - 1e3) / totalAssets()subtracts dead shares from supply but does not add them to totalAssets. This asymmetry defeats the protection. Once any user deposits, subsequent depositors are vulnerable:1e18 * 1 / 1e18 = 1 shareThe OpenZeppelin virtual offset pattern mitigates this by adding the offset to both sides:
assets * (supply + offset) / (totalAssets + offset). This ensures the offset continuously dilutes donation attacks throughout the vault's lifetime, not just initially.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents