🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix potential SQL injection in db query#20
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Implemented an explicit string-match allowlist check for database field retrieval functions (`get_book_field`, `get_book_i64_field`, etc.). This ensures that only safe, known column names can be dynamically queried and prevents the possibility of a SQL injection via field interpolation. Co-authored-by: jspann21 <179991454+jspann21@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Potential SQL Injection through dynamic query string interpolation of column names (
format!("SELECT {field_name} FROM books WHERE id = ?1")) insrc-tauri/src/library/db.rs. While it appears that most upstream functions provide safe arguments, this architecture lacks a defense-in-depth safety mechanism making it extremely fragile to regressions.🎯 Impact: If
field_namecould be manipulated by a user, an attacker could extract unauthorized information or manipulate query logic, bypassing access controls entirely.🔧 Fix: Introduced an explicit string match allowlist function (
is_safe_book_column) and addedanyhow::ensure!validations before injectingfield_nameinto queries. This ensures that any invalid or unanticipated field names will instantly short-circuit and fail safely.✅ Verification: Verified by checking that
cargo testandpnpm teststill pass. Existing operations will function cleanly, but malicious inputs will fail immediately.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4421034108336006557 started by @jspann21