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| ``` | ||||||
| BIP: ? | ||||||
| Layer: Peer Services | ||||||
| Title: P2P UTXO Set Sharing | ||||||
| Authors: Fabian Jahr <fjahr@protonmail.com> | ||||||
| Status: Draft | ||||||
| Type: Specification | ||||||
| Assigned: ? | ||||||
| License: BSD-2-Clause | ||||||
| Discussion: 2026-05-06: https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/rThmyI8ZN3Q | ||||||
| Version: 0.5.0 | ||||||
| Requires: 434 | ||||||
| ``` | ||||||
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||||||
| ## Abstract | ||||||
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| This BIP defines a P2P protocol extension for sharing full UTXO sets between peers. It introduces | ||||||
| a new service bit `NODE_UTXO_SET` advertising a deterministic schedule of served heights, four new | ||||||
| P2P messages (`getutxotree`, `utxotree`, `getutxoset`, `utxoset`) negotiated via a BIP 434 feature, | ||||||
| and a chunk-hash list anchored to a Merkle root known to the requesting node, enabling per-chunk | ||||||
| verification. This allows bootstrapping nodes to leapfrog to a recent height by obtaining the | ||||||
| required UTXO set directly from the P2P network via mechanisms such as assumeutxo. | ||||||
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||||||
| ## Motivation | ||||||
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| The assumeutxo feature (implemented in Bitcoin Core) allows nodes to begin operating from a serialized | ||||||
| UTXO set while validating | ||||||
| historical blocks in the background. However, there is currently no canonical source for obtaining this | ||||||
| data. Users must either generate one themselves from a fully synced node (using `dumptxoutset` in | ||||||
| Bitcoin Core), or download one from a third party. | ||||||
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| By enabling UTXO set sharing over the P2P network, new nodes can obtain the data directly from | ||||||
| peers, removing the dependency on external infrastructure. | ||||||
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||||||
| ## Specification | ||||||
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| The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document are to be | ||||||
| interpreted as described in RFC 2119. | ||||||
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||||||
| ### Service Bit | ||||||
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| | Name | Bit | Description | | ||||||
| |------|-----|-------------| | ||||||
| | `NODE_UTXO_SET` | 14 (0x4000) | The node serves complete UTXO set data for the scheduled heights (see [Scheduled UTXO Set Heights](#scheduled-utxo-set-heights)). | | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Should setting this bit also indicate that you are able to serve blocks between H2 and the tip? That is up to ~30k blocks which might be 60GGB to 120GB vs NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED which only guarantees 288 blocks. Or will nodes just need to find NODE_NETWORK peers to finish IBD in general? (At height N=961631, H2 is 931392 which is 30,239 blocks earlier)
Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I don’t think this proposal needs to solve that, when |
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| A node MUST NOT set this bit unless it can serve the UTXO sets at the scheduled heights defined below. | ||||||
| A node signaling `NODE_UTXO_SET` MUST be capable of responding to `getutxotree` and `getutxoset` | ||||||
| requests for the scheduled heights `H1` and `H2`, including the full chunk-hash list and every chunk of | ||||||
| those sets. It MAY additionally serve UTXO sets at other heights. | ||||||
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||||||
| ### Scheduled UTXO Set Heights | ||||||
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| To make the `NODE_UTXO_SET` service bit meaningful for peer discovery, advertising nodes serve UTXO | ||||||
| sets at a deterministic schedule of block heights derived from the current tip. All heights refer to | ||||||
| blocks on the active most-work chain. | ||||||
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| Let: | ||||||
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| * `N` = height of the current chain tip | ||||||
| * `M = N - 2016` (the height as of approximately two weeks ago) | ||||||
| * `K = 14112` (7 difficulty adjustment periods, approximately three months) | ||||||
| * `H1 = M - (M mod K)` (the most recent multiple of `K` that is buried by at least 2016 blocks) | ||||||
| * `H2 = H1 - K` (the preceding multiple of `K`) | ||||||
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| A node advertising `NODE_UTXO_SET` MUST be able to serve the UTXO sets at heights `H1` and `H2` as | ||||||
| computed from the current tip. Serving two consecutive scheduled heights guarantees an overlap | ||||||
| window: when a new height becomes `H1`, the previous one remains available as `H2`, so an in-progress | ||||||
| download is not interrupted. | ||||||
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| The 2016-block offset ensures a height becomes scheduled only once it is buried by approximately two | ||||||
| weeks, which should make it safe from reorganization and gives serving nodes time to produce the | ||||||
| snapshot before it is requested. | ||||||
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||||||
| ### Feature Negotiation | ||||||
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| Support for the messages in this document is negotiated per connection via the BIP 434 `feature` | ||||||
| message, using `featureid` `BIPXXXX` (TODO) and empty `featuredata`. A node implementing these | ||||||
|
Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I thought that the If all nodes that implement the protocol send this feature message, the only other way to find out whether a node can serve the release-hardcoded heights would be by asking If a user wants to download the UTXO set for the trusted hash hardcoded in the latest release, how do they find peers that serve it?
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I think the idea is that:
So knowing the heights doesn't add anything useful there, I think -- at best it saves you maybe a 100 bytes of message data before you realise they can't send you chunks? |
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| messages advertises this feature and MUST NOT send any of them to a peer that has not. | ||||||
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| Advertising the feature indicates only that a node implements the protocol while `NODE_UTXO_SET` | ||||||
| indicates it additionally serves the scheduled heights. A node setting `NODE_UTXO_SET` MUST also | ||||||
| advertise the feature. | ||||||
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| ### Data Structures | ||||||
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| #### Serialized UTXO Set | ||||||
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| The serialized UTXO set uses the format established by the Bitcoin Core RPC `dumptxoutset` (as of Bitcoin Core v31). | ||||||
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| **Header (55 bytes):** | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
| | `magic` | `bytes` | 5 | `0x7574786fff` (ASCII `utxo` + `0xff`). | | ||||||
| | `version` | `uint16_t` | 2 | Format version. | | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Should specify the value ( |
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| | `network_magic` | `bytes` | 4 | Network message start bytes. | | ||||||
| | `base_height` | `uint32_t` | 4 | Block height of the UTXO set. | | ||||||
| | `base_blockhash` | `uint256` | 32 | Block hash of the UTXO set. | | ||||||
| | `coins_count` | `uint64_t` | 8 | Total number of coins (UTXOs) in the set. | | ||||||
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| **Body (coin data):** | ||||||
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| Coins are grouped by transaction hash. For each group: | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
| | `txid` | `uint256` | 32 | Transaction hash. | | ||||||
| | `num_coins` | `compact_size` | 1–9 | Number of outputs for this txid. | | ||||||
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| For each coin in the group: | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
| | `vout_index` | `compact_size` | 1–9 | Output index. | | ||||||
| | `coin` | `Coin` | variable | Serialized coin (varint-encoded code for height/coinbase, then compressed txout). | | ||||||
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| Coins are ordered lexicographically by outpoint (txid, then vout index), matching the LevelDB iteration | ||||||
| order of the coins database. | ||||||
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| #### Chunk Merkle Tree | ||||||
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| The serialized UTXO set (header + body) is split into chunks of exactly 3,900,000 bytes (3.9 MB). The | ||||||
| last chunk contains the remaining bytes and may be smaller. The chunks form the leaves of a binary | ||||||
| Merkle tree whose root commits to the entire UTXO set. | ||||||
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| The leaf hash for each chunk is `SHA256d(chunk_data)`. The tree is built as a balanced binary tree. When | ||||||
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fjahr marked this conversation as resolved.
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| the number of nodes at a level is odd, the last node is promoted unchanged to the next level. | ||||||
| Interior nodes are computed as `SHA256d(left_child || right_child)`. | ||||||
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| The leaves are delivered to the node in a single `utxotree` response. A node that knows | ||||||
| the Merkle root for a given UTXO set checks a received list of leaves by recomputing the root and | ||||||
| comparing. The Merkle root is the sole trust input required to verify the integrity of the received UTXO set. | ||||||
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| `SHA256d` denotes double-SHA256: `SHA256d(x) = SHA256(SHA256(x))`. | ||||||
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| ### Messages | ||||||
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| #### `getutxotree` | ||||||
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| Sent to request the chunk-hash list for a specific UTXO set. | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
| | `block_hash` | `uint256` | 32 | Block hash identifying the requested UTXO set. | | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I think |
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| A node that has advertised `NODE_UTXO_SET` and can serve the requested UTXO set MUST respond with | ||||||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. nit
Suggested change
Contributor
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I looked at many other BIPs, particularly 152 and 157 in terms of the language they use for similar situations and that's how I ended up with |
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| `utxotree`. If the serving node cannot fulfill the request, it MUST NOT respond. The requesting | ||||||
| node SHOULD apply a reasonable timeout and try another peer. | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I think a notfound message would be better here, really. Failing that, perhaps the serving node should disconnect, rather than simply not responding? If you're trying to obtain your first utxo set, and this connection can't do it, there's not much benefit to either party to keeping the connection open is there? Likewise for inability to respond to |
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| #### `utxotree` | ||||||
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| Sent in response to `getutxotree`, delivering the full chunk-hash list along with per-snapshot | ||||||
| metadata. | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
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fjahr marked this conversation as resolved.
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| | `block_hash` | `uint256` | 32 | Block hash this data corresponds to. | | ||||||
| | `version` | `uint16_t` | 2 | Format version of the serialized UTXO set. | | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. These are redundant -- you're already checking them when you verify the chunk_hahses match the hardcoded hash. |
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| | `data_length` | `uint64_t` | 8 | Total size of the serialized UTXO set in bytes (header + body). | | ||||||
| | `chunk_hashes` | `uint256[]` | 32 × N | The ordered list of N chunk hashes, where N = `ceil(data_length / 3,900,000)`. | | ||||||
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| Upon receiving a `utxotree` message, the requesting node MUST recompute the Merkle root from | ||||||
| `chunk_hashes` and compare it against the Merkle root it knows for the corresponding UTXO set. If | ||||||
| the roots do not match, the node MUST discard the response and MUST disconnect the peer. | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I believe that if you don't include |
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| #### `getutxoset` | ||||||
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Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Contributor
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Chunk is just a very generic term in computer science, it's part of the http spec as well and thus we have the term appearing several times in the libevent replacement code as well (both client and server) which can not be avoided. Initially, I also wasn't the happiest about it but I just couldn't find a different term for it that felt right, especially considering how http uses the term and how that analogy seems to match pretty well. This also explains the message naming: The message transports the UTXO set, chunks is just an aspect of the transport mechanism in the http analogy. At least that's how felt most comfortable with reasoning about it. I think Cluster Mempool would have had a more wide pick of fitting terminology to chose from but that ship has sailed. Happy to still consider a renaming if anyone has a good suggestion but all the alternatives I could think of didn't seem to fit well enough. I also obviously prefer shorter naming in order to not make squeezing it in 12 characters too awkward.
Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I don’t feel that strongly about it, your response resolves it for me. |
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| Sent to request a single chunk of UTXO set data. The requesting node MUST have received a `utxotree` | ||||||
| for the corresponding UTXO set (from any peer) before sending this message. | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
| | `block_hash` | `uint256` | 32 | Block hash identifying the requested UTXO set. | | ||||||
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Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Should be the chunk merkle root hash -- what if you're serving utxo sets for block B in both format 2 and some future format 3? |
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| | `chunk_index` | `uint32_t` | 4 | Zero-based index of the requested chunk. | | ||||||
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| If the serving node cannot fulfill the request, it MUST NOT respond. The requesting node SHOULD apply | ||||||
| a reasonable timeout and try another peer. | ||||||
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| #### `utxoset` | ||||||
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| Sent in response to `getutxoset`, delivering one chunk. | ||||||
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| | Field | Type | Size | Description | | ||||||
| |-------|------|------|-------------| | ||||||
| | `block_hash` | `uint256` | 32 | Block hash this data corresponds to. | | ||||||
| | `chunk_index` | `uint32_t` | 4 | Zero-based index of this chunk. | | ||||||
| | `data` | `bytes` | variable | Chunk payload, exactly 3.9 MB except for the last chunk. | | ||||||
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| The transfer is receiver-driven: the requesting node sends one `getutxoset` per chunk. Chunks MAY be | ||||||
| requested in any order and from different peers. | ||||||
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| Upon receiving a `utxoset` message, the node MUST compute `SHA256d(data)` and compare it against | ||||||
| `chunk_hashes[chunk_index]` from the `utxotree` it accepted for this UTXO set. If the hashes do not | ||||||
| match, the node MUST discard the chunk and MUST disconnect the peer. A node SHOULD also disconnect | ||||||
| a peer that sends a `utxoset` message with fields (`chunk_index`, `block_hash`) that do not match | ||||||
| the outstanding request. | ||||||
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| After all chunks have been received, the node SHOULD parse the reassembled UTXO set against the | ||||||
| serialized UTXO set format to confirm it is well-formed. | ||||||
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| ### Protocol Flow | ||||||
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| 1. The requesting node identifies peers advertising `NODE_UTXO_SET`. | ||||||
| 2. The requesting node sends `getutxotree` for the desired block hash to one of these peers, or to | ||||||
| several peers to corroborate the Merkle root by agreement if no trusted root is available. | ||||||
| 3. The peer or peers respond with `utxotree`. The requesting node verifies each response by | ||||||
| recomputing the Merkle root and comparing it against a value it knows for the given UTXO set, | ||||||
| either from a trusted source or from agreement among multiple peers. A single accepted `utxotree` | ||||||
| can be used as the basis for all subsequent chunk requests for this UTXO set, regardless of | ||||||
| which peer those chunks are fetched from. | ||||||
| 4. The requesting node downloads chunks via `getutxoset`/`utxoset` exchanges, verifying each chunk | ||||||
| against its entry in the accepted `utxotree` on receipt. On verification failure the peer is | ||||||
| disconnected and download continues from another peer without losing already-verified chunks. | ||||||
| 5. After all chunks are received, the node parses the reassembled UTXO set against the serialized | ||||||
| UTXO set format to confirm that it is well-formed. | ||||||
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| Serving nodes are free to limit the number of concurrent and repeated transfers per peer at their own | ||||||
| discretion to manage resource consumption. | ||||||
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| ## Rationale | ||||||
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| **Usage of service bit 14:** Service bits allow selective peer discovery through | ||||||
| DNS seeds and addr relay. Bit 14 is chosen because bits 12 and 13 are reserved by the | ||||||
| Utreexo proposal (BIP 183 draft). | ||||||
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| **Direct request model:** Peers signal availability of UTXO sets via the `NODE_UTXO_SET` | ||||||
| service bit; the requesting node identifies the desired UTXO set by block hash when sending | ||||||
| `getutxotree`. The serving node responds only if it can serve that specific UTXO set. | ||||||
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| **Per-chunk verification:** The chunk-hash list returned in `utxotree` enables each chunk to be verified | ||||||
| by direct lookup against the accepted list as it arrives, allowing immediate detection of corrupt data, | ||||||
| peer switching without data loss, and parallel download from multiple peers. The list itself is small | ||||||
| (~80 KB for a ~10 GB set). The specified serialization is deterministic, so all honest nodes produce | ||||||
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Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. If a node is expected to source chunks from multiple different peers, is it really necessary to receive the entire tree description of 80 KB from each of the peers?
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. The spec says "The requesting node sends
Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I read line 133,134
as the serving node not being permitted to respond to
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Perhaps it would be better to send
Contributor
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. @murchandamus I tightened the language you were not happy with, primarily in the Protocol Flow section. Please let me know if it works better for you now. @ajtowns It's an interesting suggestion. I am not convinced so far since I don't really like overloading original message semantics (its a new protocol, we may at least do it right in the beginning). I also think the explicit nope doesn't gain us that much and at the same time moves us backwards with regards to @luke-jr 's concerns. Did you have specific thoughts on this? If we would do your suggestion then I would almost feel better about adding the -info discovery approach again. But I haven't thought about it that much, I will continue to ponder this.
Member
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Reading the diff, I think there is still one thing that could be clearer: from the perspective of the serving node, is it required that a peer has first sent |
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| byte-identical output, guaranteeing Merkle root agreement. | ||||||
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| **3.9 MB chunk size:** The number balances round trips (~2,560 for a ~10 GB set) against memory usage | ||||||
| for buffering and verifying a single chunk. Smaller chunks would increase protocol overhead; larger | ||||||
| chunks would increase memory pressure on constrained devices commonly used to run Bitcoin nodes. | ||||||
| Together with the additional message overhead, the `utxoset` message including the chunk data also | ||||||
| sits just below the theoretical maximum block size which means any implementation should be able to | ||||||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. It also happens to sit just below the maximum P2P message size MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH, so it may be clearer to refer to that instead of block size
Contributor
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Yeah, but this was a contious decision actually. |
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| handle messages of this size. | ||||||
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| **Reusing the `dumptxoutset` format:** Avoids introducing a new serialization format and ensures | ||||||
| compatibility with UTXO sets already being generated and shared. | ||||||
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| **Relationship to BIP 64:** BIP 64 defined a protocol for querying individual UTXOs by outpoint and is | ||||||
| now closed. This BIP addresses a different use case: bulk transfer of the entire UTXO set for node | ||||||
| bootstrapping. | ||||||
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| ## Backwards Compatibility | ||||||
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| This proposal is backward compatible. Peers that do not implement it ignore the new service bit | ||||||
| and never issue the new messages. Feature negotiation follows BIP 434, so peers that do not | ||||||
| recognize the feature ignore it. | ||||||
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| ## Reference Implementation | ||||||
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| [Bitcoin Core implementation pull request](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/35054) | ||||||
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| ## Acknowledgements | ||||||
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| Thanks to Anthony Towns for suggesting that the requesting node fetch the full chunk-hash list up front | ||||||
| via the `getutxotree`/`utxotree` exchange rather than per-chunk Merkle proofs, using the Merkle root as | ||||||
| the sole trust anchor in place of a separate serialized hash, dropping the redundant `num_chunks` field, | ||||||
| and the deterministic schedule of served heights. | ||||||
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| Thanks also to Murch for catching the service-bit collision with the Utreexo proposal, raising | ||||||
| the Merkle tree malleability concern behind promoting odd nodes unchanged rather than duplicating them, | ||||||
| and prompting the Backwards Compatibility section; stickies-v for raising the data-availability concern | ||||||
| that motivated a fixed schedule of served heights; Luke Dashjr for arguing against a separate discovery | ||||||
| step on privacy grounds and suggesting the serialization format version be carried; and Daniela Brozzoni | ||||||
| for helping make the peer-disconnection rules consistent. | ||||||
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| ## Copyright | ||||||
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| This BIP is made available under the terms of the 2-clause BSD license. See | ||||||
| https://opensource.org/license/BSD-2-Clause for more information. | ||||||
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| ## Changelog | ||||||
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| * __0.5.0__ (2026-06-03): | ||||||
| * Defined a deterministic schedule of served heights for the `NODE_UTXO_SET` service bit | ||||||
| * Added BIP 434 feature negotiation to signal support for the protocol messages | ||||||
| * Added Acknowledgements section | ||||||
| * __0.4.0__ (2026-05-18): | ||||||
| * Removed `num_chunks` from `utxotree` | ||||||
| * __0.3.0__ (2026-05-17): | ||||||
| * Moved service bit from 12 to 14 to avoid collision with the Utreexo proposal (BIP 183 draft) | ||||||
| * Changed Merkle tree construction: odd nodes are promoted unchanged rather than duplicated | ||||||
| * __0.2.0__ (2026-05-04): | ||||||
| * Dropped discovery before download approach, instead request the chunk-hash list via `getutxotree`/`utxotree` | ||||||
| * Dropped per-chunk Merkle proofs; chunks verified directly against the chunk-hash list | ||||||
| * Dropped `height` from requests (`block_hash` is the sole identifier); added format `version` to `utxotree` | ||||||
| * Dropped references to the serialized hash; the Merkle root is the sole integrity check | ||||||
| * __0.1.0__ (2026-04-10): | ||||||
| * Initial draft | ||||||
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