| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.3.x | yes |
| 0.2.x | security fixes only |
| < 0.2 | no |
The vault holds user funds, so we take reports seriously. If you believe you
have found a vulnerability in the vault, the factory, the policy surface, or
the SDK, report it privately by emailing security@wane.network with:
- A short description of the issue
- A minimal reproduction (a Foundry test case, transaction hashes, or logs)
- Your assessment of the impact
- Whether you intend to disclose publicly and, if so, on what timeline
We will acknowledge your report within 72 hours and provide a disclosure timeline that does not put users at risk. Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.
In scope:
WaneVaultandWaneVaultFactory(fund custody, screening, CREATE2)- The policy view surface
WaneVaultcalls (evaluate,evaluateCall) @wane/vault-sdkcalldata construction and address derivation
Out of scope:
- Front-end (wane.network) issues unrelated to wallet interactions
- Issues that require physical access to a maintainer's device
- Social engineering of community members
- Already-known issues tracked in our internal queue
- The vault can only block, never divert. The only exits are
execute()(screened) andwithdraw*()(owner-only, back to the owner), so funds are never trapped and never redirectable by the contract. - Screening is fail-closed: if the policy flags a target,
execute()reverts withBlocked(target, reason)before any value moves. - The real ERC-20 recipient is decoded from calldata and screened, so a token drain to a flagged address is caught even though the call target is the token.
We follow a 90-day coordinated disclosure window by default and may extend it for critical issues that require user-side action such as a migration.