| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.4.x | yes |
| 0.3.x | security fixes only |
| < 0.3 | no |
If you believe you have found a vulnerability in wane-sdk, in the instruction
or transaction construction paths, or in how the SDK derives addresses, PDAs,
or screens calldata, report it privately by emailing security@wane.network
with:
- A short description of the issue
- A minimal reproduction (a failing test case, program logs, or transaction hash / signature that demonstrates the bug)
- Your assessment of the impact
- Whether you intend to disclose publicly and, if so, on what timeline
We acknowledge reports within 72 hours and provide a disclosure timeline that does not put users at risk. Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.
In scope:
- The EVM client signing and address-encoding paths (
src/evm) - The Solana client instruction builders and PDA derivation (
src/solana) - Any path where a flagged target could be slipped past the on-chain screen
Out of scope:
- The on-chain contracts and programs themselves (reported in their own repos)
- Issues that require a compromised host environment or stolen keys
- Social engineering of community members
- The Solana session vault binds the destination's antibody PDA by seeds, so a flagged send cannot be slipped through by omitting or swapping the account.
- The EVM
send()refuses to broadcast an unscreened transfer if the wallet is not 7702-protected, instead of silently sending a no-op self-call. - Both clients fail closed: a flagged target raises
WaneBlockedErrorbefore any value moves.
We follow a 90-day coordinated disclosure window by default and may extend it for critical issues that need user-side action.