Goal

Build an adversarial protocol proof of concept for user-mediated cross-server
identity brokerage without persistent user-held keys.

The PoC should establish whether multiple Chatto accounts can form a portable
identity group using mutually signed server certificates and disposable client
ceremony secrets, while preventing one malicious existing server from adding a
new member without another current group member's approval.

Scope

• Implement a focused Go protocol package and HTTP-based multi-server harness.
• Create a two-server genesis identity group.
• Add subsequent members with approval from the target server and two current
  member servers.
• Bind all offers and certificates to exact origins, opaque user IDs, group IDs,
  nonces, expiry, and a disposable client ceremony proof.
• Verify certificates from a clean client with no retained secret state.
• Cover tampering, replay, expiry, idempotency, partial completion, revocation,
  and a synthetic 20-server group.
• Document the security properties, trust boundary, and production integration
  questions discovered by the PoC.

Deliberate exclusions

• No production ConnectRPC or realtime API commitment.
• No persisted core protobuf/event schema yet.
• No frontend/profile UI.
• No production server signing-key storage or rotation design.
• No final recovery policy.

Acceptance criteria

• Twenty accounts require linear membership certificates rather than a
  pairwise mesh.
• A clean verifier reconstructs the same identity group from public
  certificates.
• Modifying any bound account, origin, group, nonce, or expiry invalidates the
  certificate.
• Replayed or expired ceremony artifacts are rejected.
• One malicious current member server cannot add an attacker-controlled account
  without a second current member approval.
• The PoC has focused tests and a concise design report describing what would
  move into RUNTIME_STATE and EVT in a production implementation.