Summary
A generated repository can have a green self-generated test suite and still be unsafe or misleading to publish. Yabloko Labs' Atomic evaluation required three successive independent review cycles after the nominal coding pass; each found additional correctness, numerical, packaging, metadata, documentation, or provenance defects.
This issue consolidates findings §13, §16, and §17. It is not solely a runtime bug—model quality and task scope matter—but Atomic should not equate “generated tests pass” with “public-ready.”
Observed gap
The system prompt correctly requires real execution and verification:
That is necessary but insufficient for release claims. In the evaluated repository, passing tests coexisted with defects including:
- invalid citation/package metadata and placeholder URLs;
- incorrect licensing/provenance attribution;
- CI installing an undefined dependency extra;
- untested mathematical edge cases and non-finite inputs;
- non-standard JSON output;
- no-op tests and incomplete formula assertions;
- additional numerical overflow/underflow defects found only by adversarial review.
The final tree was publishable only after a frozen-hash numerical audit and an independent security/publication audit both passed.
Proposed behavior
Add an opt-in, fail-closed release-review workflow for requests that explicitly target publication, packaging, or release. It should separate implementation from review and bind the verdict to the exact reviewed tree/hash.
A useful baseline can include:
- clean install/build from a fresh environment;
- project tests plus warnings-as-errors where supported;
- package/wheel/archive content inspection;
- placeholder, secret, private-path, and agent-provenance scan;
- metadata, license, citation, URLs, and documented-command validation;
- an approved second reviewer focused on adversarial domain edge cases;
- invalidation of the verdict after any file change.
Explicit publish intent is not consent to transmit a private repository to another provider. Cross-provider review or external hooks require a separate approval naming the reviewer/provider and data boundary.
Acceptance criteria
- Release review is opt-in or triggered only by explicit publish/release intent; normal coding tasks are not slowed down.
- The implementing model's generated tests are not the sole release evidence.
- Review defaults to a local reviewer or an already approved trust boundary.
- Before any source is sent to another provider or external hook, Atomic discloses what repository content will leave the machine and obtains explicit approval for that reviewer/provider and data boundary.
- External hooks run read-only and sandboxed with the minimum necessary repository scope.
- Unavailable external review reports
review unavailable; it neither exports code silently nor self-certifies.
- The review records and reports the exact git/tree hash or workspace fingerprint.
- Any post-review mutation invalidates the PASS state.
- Failed checks are surfaced as publication blockers, not hidden behind an overall green test count.
- The final reply distinguishes “implementation complete,” “tests passing,” and “release-ready.”
- Documentation explains that Atomic assists with review but does not guarantee correctness or certification.
Summary
A generated repository can have a green self-generated test suite and still be unsafe or misleading to publish. Yabloko Labs' Atomic evaluation required three successive independent review cycles after the nominal coding pass; each found additional correctness, numerical, packaging, metadata, documentation, or provenance defects.
This issue consolidates findings §13, §16, and §17. It is not solely a runtime bug—model quality and task scope matter—but Atomic should not equate “generated tests pass” with “public-ready.”
Observed gap
The system prompt correctly requires real execution and verification:
stable-prefix.tsThat is necessary but insufficient for release claims. In the evaluated repository, passing tests coexisted with defects including:
The final tree was publishable only after a frozen-hash numerical audit and an independent security/publication audit both passed.
Proposed behavior
Add an opt-in, fail-closed release-review workflow for requests that explicitly target publication, packaging, or release. It should separate implementation from review and bind the verdict to the exact reviewed tree/hash.
A useful baseline can include:
Explicit publish intent is not consent to transmit a private repository to another provider. Cross-provider review or external hooks require a separate approval naming the reviewer/provider and data boundary.
Acceptance criteria
review unavailable; it neither exports code silently nor self-certifies.